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Human supremacy as posthuman risk
Daniel Estrada
New Jersey Institute of Technology

Abstract
Human supremacy is the widely held view that human interests ought to be privileged
over other interests as a matter of public policy. Posthumanism is an historical and
cultural situation characterized by a critical reevaluation of anthropocentrist theory and
practice. This paper draws on Rosi Braidotti’s critical posthumanism and the critique of
ideal theory in Charles Mills and Serene Khader to address the use of human
supremacist rhetoric in AI ethics and policy discussions, particularly in the work of
Joanna Bryson. This analysis leads to identifying a set of risks posed by human
supremacist policy in a posthuman context, specifically involving the classification of
agents by type.
Keywords: AI Ethics, Posthumanism, Anthropocentrism, Ideal Theory, Critical Robot
Studies

Against the backdrop of numerous political scandals, ethical violations, and calls for
regulatory oversight in the field of artificial intelligence (Whittaker et al., 2018), the
rhetorical framework of the “human” has become an increasingly visible shorthand for
industry and public policy projects to signal a concern for safety, ethical integrity, and
the responsible use of the AI. Several recent public policy proposals on AI bear titles
such as “AI for Humanity” in France1; “HumaneAI” in the EU 2; “AI4People”, Luciano
Floridi’s recent proposal describing “An Ethical Framework for a Good AI Society”
(Floridi et al., 2018), and Stanford’s “Institute for Human -Centered AI,”3 whose welcome
page proudly proposes that “AI is to serve the collective needs of humanity.”
In these contexts, centering the “human” as the explicit focus of normative
concern evokes the image of an inclusive framework of shared values and common
interests to guide the collective use of AI. More subtly, these proposals consistently
frame AI in the role of a servant to human interests. Unsurprisingly, these proposals
don’t define the scope or content of the category “human,” how membership in this
category is to be determined, or what underpins its role as a focal norm in AI policy. And
yet given that AI is regularly used to target, manipulate, incarcerate, and exploit
vulnerable populations (witness the use of facial recognition technologies in policing,
military, and security; election tampering and voter manipulation on social media;
software that automates criminal sentencing, loan approval, hiring decisions, and so on;
see (Angwin, Larson, Mattu, & Kirchner, 2016; Asaro, 2016; Benjamin, 2016;
1
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Buolamwini & Gebru, 2018; Eubanks, 2018; Noble, 2018; Spiel, Keyes, & Barlas, 2019;
Williams, 2019b) and many others), how can we trust that policies which center the
“human” will also center us? It is difficult to see how technologies used to expand,
reinforce, and make more profitable these pervasive institutions of violence and
oppression could operate against a shared background of values common to all
humanity. Rosi Braidotti quotes Tony Davies: “All humanisms, until now, have been
imperial” (Braidotti, 2013, p. 15). From this perspective, the attempt to signal a
commitment to integrity by appeal to the category “human” reads as more of the empty
ethics washing that has come to characterize the field (Metzinger, 2019).
Absent from these human-centered proposals is any engagement with the
decades of sustained scholarship in feminist, postcolonial, and critical race theory
(Deckha, 2012; D. Haraway, 1989, 1991; Hayles, 2008; Mills, 2011; E. W. Said, 2004),
animal rights and environmental ethics (Belcourt, 2015; Gaard, 2011; Katz, 2000;
Steiner, 2010); STS, HCI, and design theory (Kera, Block, & Link, 2009; Latour, 2003;
Thomas, Remy, & Bates, 2017; Valentin, 2014), and related fields that have developed
systematic critiques of anthropocentrism and the politics of the “human.” Among the
important insights of this diverse literature is the recognition that a superficial appeal to
inclusive universalism can be used to justify and provide cover for narrowly self -serving,
exclusive, or imperialist practices (Giraldo, 2016; Khader, 2018). As Charles Mills puts
the point, “historically and still currently, most humans were not and are not socially
recognized persons, or, more neatly and epigrammatically put: most persons are nonpersons” (Mills, 2011). Confronting such duplicitous ideologies presents difficult
conceptual, rhetorical, and practical challenges, suggesting that care should be taken in
the use of universalizing language (if it is used at all). The uncritical deployment in AI
policy of human-centered rhetoric as a pretense to ethical integrity speaks not only as a
tacit endorsement of its imperialist undertones, but more loudly as utter disregard for
those scholars and activists who have been consistently engaged with the “human” as a
normative ground.
This paper seeks to correct these omissions and provoke the AI community to
adopt a more reflective, informed, and critical perspective on the way human-centered
rhetoric can function as a cheap proxy for ethical integrity. To these ends we engage
the work of Joanna Bryson, prominent scholar, public speaker, and policy consultant in
AI ethics, and author of the unfortunate paper “Robots Should Be Slaves” (Bryson,
2010). In this and several other essays (Bryson & Kime, 2011; Bryson, Diamantis, &
Grant, 2017; Bryson, 2018a, 2018b), Bryson and colleagues construct a vision of the
ethical use of AI that renders these technologies as an explicit social underclass
modelled after the historical institutions of slavery. This rendering of the “human” as
categorically dominant over artificial agents in virtue of our kind is the target of this
analysis of “human supremacy.” Reading Bryson through the wealth of critical
scholarship on humanism and anthropocentrism, especially as discussed in critical race
and postcolonial studies, does not merely raise a set of objections to the tone and
content of her work. It also offers a case study on the relative ease with which
ideologies of oppression can develop from what might seem like an innocuous
commitment to an ethic and ontology that puts the “human” first.
Bryson is by no means alone in her explicit endorsement of the institutionalized
slavery of machines (Petersen 2007, 2012). Oscar Wilde anticipates the position as
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early as 1891: “Human slavery is wrong, insecure, and demoralising. On mechanical
slavery, on the slavery of the machine, the future of the world depends” (Wilde, 1891).
Ruha Benjamin presents a striking example of human supremacist rhetoric in an article
from Mechanix Illustrated from 1965 that predicts “Slavery will be back! We’ll all have
personal slaves again… Don’t be alarmed. We mean robot ‘slaves’.” Benjamin notes
that “It goes without saying that readers, so casually hailed as “we,” are not the
descendants of those whom Lincoln freed” (Benjamin, 2019, p. 56). This helps locate
the matrix of oppression, artificial agency, and group identity that we wish to address
with a critical evaluation of human supremacy in AI. Benjamin continues: “For those of
us who believe in a more egalitarian notion of power, of collective empowerment without
domination, how we imagine our relation to robots offers a mirror for thinking through
and against race as technology” (Benjamin, 2019, p. 56ff). This paper is presented in
solidarity with those communities who share this commitment to collective
empowerment.
The paper is organized as follows. We begin by introducing the term “human
supremacy” as it appears in the animal advocacy literature, and we engage the
conceptual and interpretive challenges the term invites in its application to AI ethics. We
go on to sketch Bryson’s human-centered approach to AI ethics as a paradigm case of
human supremacy, addressing its theoretical grounding and consequences for policy.
With Bryson’s views unpacked, we then turn to two resources to understand them: Rosi
Braidotti’s discussion of reactionary posthumanism in Martha Nussbaum, and the
critique of ideal theory in Charles Mills and Serene Khader. This scaffolding reveals the
ideological and institutional foundations for Bryson’s position, and points to an
alternative approach that emphasizes the nonideal conditions within which subjectivity
and community operate. The paper closes with reflections on the risks of human
supremacist politics in a posthuman age, specifically concerning the classification of
agents by type.

Human Supremacy in Animal Rights and AI Ethics
Human supremacy is the view that human interests ought to be systematically
privileged over other interests as a matter of public policy. The term derives from
activist-scholars in animal rights and environmental ethics (Crist, 2017; Lupinacci, 2015;
Steiner, 2010) who object to anthropocentric policies that neglect the welfare and
integrity of nonhuman biological and ecological systems. Similar terms can be found in,
for instance, Mary Midgley’s “human chauvinism” or “exclusive humanism” (Midgley,
2003). However, the term “human supremacy” draws on a deliberately provocative
analogy to white supremacy, that pervasive system of racist structural power and
oppression which systematically privileges the interests of people identified as “white”
relative to people who, for various historical and sociopolitical reasons, are not so
identified. Analogously, human supremacy names those practices which systematically
privilege the “human” relative to the “nonhuman”. Such ideologies of oppression cannot
be easily reduced to the prejudiced beliefs or attitudes that some individuals or groups
hold towards others. The vocabulary of oppression highlights the structural, institutional,
3

and material realities within which some social groups are systematically attacked,
exploited, and marginalized relative to others. (Frye, 1983; Young, 1988).
The problematic analogy between white supremacy and the racist oppression of
humans on one hand and human supremacy and the anthropocentric oppression of
animals and other nonhumans on the other has been addressed in critical race studies,
critical animal studies, and ecofeminist literatures (Armstrong, 2002; Gaard, 2011;
Nocella, 2012; Nocella, White, & Cudworth, 2015; Wise, 2005). These sources
emphasize that the comparison between oppressed people and industrial livestock is
deeply insensitive to the history of racialized chattel slavery that operated on this
analogy4. Critical animal studies scholar Anthony Nocella (2012) argues that members
of the animal advocacy movement rarely share a common experience of oppression,
either as a community or with the animals they advocate for. This points to an important
disanalogy between the (nonhuman) animal rights movement and the ongoing struggles
against racist, sexist, ableist, and colonialist oppression. A nonhuman animal might
maul its captor and escape its bonds, but th at animal cannot engage directly in political
resistance without animal activists working on their behalf. The resistance to the
oppression of humans stands in stark contrast; Nocella quotes political prisoner and
former member of the Black Panther Party Jalil Muntaqim, “We are our own liberators”
(Nocella, 2012, p. 148).
To avoid the “white savior complex” the phrase “animal liberation” implies,
Nocella suggests thinking instead of “animal justice,” and appreciating how
interconnected structures of oppression and domination reveals that “fighting for human
animal rights is fighting for nonhuman animal rights” (Nocella, 2012, p. 150). Similarly,
Gaard (2011) points to efforts in ecofeminist thought that foreground the intersections of
race, gender, class, and ecology, for example in, “industrialized animal food
production and its reliance on undocumented immigrant workers (who risk
deportation if they report their hazardou s workplace conditions)” (Gaard, 2011, p.
36). Nocella offers several recommendations to integrate the work of animal advocacy
more deeply with other struggles to end oppression , including centering the work of
people of color who are engaged in social justice and animal advocacy; challenging
one’s own whiteness, domination, and elitism5; and resisting the comparison between
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Reacting to a series of photo campaigns from the People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) with titles
like “Are Animals the New Slaves?” and “Holocaust on your plate”, white anti-racist author Tim Wise explains this
insensitivity by appeal to the white privilege of many animal rights activists:
“That PETA can’t understand what it means for a black person to be compared to an animal, given a
history of having been thought of in exactly those terms, isn’t the least bit shocking. After all, the
movement is perhaps the whitest of all progressive or radical movements on the planet, for reasons
owing to the privilege one must possess in order to focus on animal rights as opposed to, say, surviving
oneself from institutional oppression.” (Wise, 2005)
5 While I do not identify as white, I am a straight cisgendered able-bodied man with an education and a full-time
teaching position at a public technical institute, and these advantages put me in a position of privilege relative to
many oppressed and marginalized people. These advantages have allowed me the opportunity to address the
social status of artificial agents as a philosophical and scholar-activist project, an opportunity made possible by the
very same social structures that are systematically targeting Latinx members of my communities in Southern
California for detention and deportation. I’d like to acknowledge that this research was done during the tragic
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forms of oppression “if that comparison is not met with action, and is not examined for
the purpose of understanding the oppressor” (Nocella, 2012, p. 152).
Nocella’s advice applies equally to the potentially insensitive comparisons the
term “human supremacy” invites in the context of artificial agents and AI6. It is critical to
bear in mind that the that the discourse around the “human” arises in the AI literature at
the same time as egregious ethical failures in both industry and public policy that
disproportionately impact the lives of people who have already been marginalized and
exploited by racism and white supremacy, sexism and patriarchy, transphobia, ableism,
nationalist xenophobia, and other forms of systemic oppression (Bardzell & Bardzell,
2015; Irani, Vertesi, Dourish, Philip, & Grinter, 2010; Keyes, Hoy, & Drouhard, 2019). A
critical inquiry into human supremacy in AI and the systematic oppression of robots, or
what might be called critical robot studies, is motivated by an attempt to expose a
particularly salient form of anthropocentric ideology in mainstream AI ethics, and to
resist its use to politically justify and institutionalize those oppressive practices. This
approach does not imply a comparison between the (potential) experiences of artificial
agents and the multiple intersecting forms of discrimination and oppression faced by
black and brown people, women and LGBTQIA+ people, and other marginalized groups
under white supremacy, cisheteronormative patriarchy, and other entrenched systems
of power. Nocella says, “All suffering is different and is based on individual experience
even if the oppressive tactic is the same” (Nocella, 2012, p. 147). Our goal is not to
speak on behalf of or “liberate” robots, nor to merely appropriate the language and
culture of activist movements. Instead, our goal is to contribute to the struggle against
all forms of oppression by examining one manifestation of a tactic that impacts the
operation and public participation of both humans and nonhumans alike; namely, the
political classification of agents by type, and the systematic privileging of some agential
types relative to others (Benjamin, 2016; Braun, 2014; Reardon, 2009).
We adapt the term “human supremacy” from the context of animal and
environmental advocacy to the field of AI in order to name a nefarious mode of
classification politics that places the “human” as the locus of systemic privilege. Used in
this way, the term retains much of its original meaning. Nevertheless, the critique of
human supremacy in AI presents several unique challenges that distinguish it from the
animal advocacy case. One important difference is that while anthropocentrism in
environmental policy can be subtle and may require critical interpretive efforts to
“recognize” (Lupinacci, 2015), in AI human supremacy is often overt, with the “human”
presented as the explicit basis for political alliance, as we will see in Bryson’s view in
the next section. To this extent, the term “human supremacy” functions less as an
accusation of covert oppressive behavior by analogy to racial oppression, and more as
an accurate description of an ideological position framed in its proponent’s own terms.
expansion of for-profit concentration camps at the border that have kept innocent people in ter rible conditions
and have separated thousands of children from their parents.
6 The term “AI” and “robot” are used to include all technologies addressed under the labels artificial intelligence,
machine learning, robotics, autonomous vehicles and drones, autonomous weapons systems and surveillance
equipment, IoT and “smart” appliances, social media bots and other artificial software agents (anthropomorphic or
not), various expert systems and efficient database management architectures, and nearby technologi es. The
terms for identifying and distinguishing between artificial agents playing various roles remains largely unsettled.
Occasionally the term “system” or “machine” will be used as inclusive of humans and nonhumans.
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Before describing Bryson’s view in more detail, we should discuss why humancentered politics is so broadly welcomed in AI ethics, despite the dismal status of the
human in the political climate of the Anthropocene (Ellis, 2015; D. J. Haraway, 2016;
Lewis & Maslin, 2015). The literature discusses two justifications which have, on their
surface, relatively little to do with each other: the existing international policy framework
of human rights (Latonero, 2018; Risse, 2018), and the presumed metaphysical nonagency of artifacts like machines and pieces of software (Boden et al., 2017; Fossa,
2018). These justifications will be addressed in later sections through the lens of
Braidotti’s critical posthumanism and Mills’ critique of ideal theory respectively.
However, one version of the second justification should be addressed before moving
from the animal ethics literature.
It is commonly argued that AI is neither biological nor alive, so cannot suffer like
animals and other living creatures, and therefore cannot participate in a moral
community in the relevant way to deserve moral consideration . If animal advocacy is
primarily motivated by animal suffering, and robots cannot suffer, this would seem to
undermine the possibility that robots could stand in need of the sort of political activism
seen in the animal advocacy movement. Such arguments are not convincing on several
grounds. Environmentalists since Aldo Leopold’s Land Ethic (1949) have emphasized
the value of nonliving systems like the soil, water, and air that do not “suffer” in the
experiential sense of animals with a nervous system, but which nevertheless are vital
for the integrity of ecological communities, and so might play a focal role in our norms
and practices (Konopka, 2013). Kate Darling (2016) notes that while the philosophical
and ethical discussion of animal rights revolves around issues like pain and
consciousness, “our laws indicate that these concerns are secondary when it comes to
legal protections” (Darling, 2016, p. 17). Instead, Darling argues that laws tend to follow
public attitudes towards animals that do not depend on biological differences, as with
laws in the US that protect horses but not cows from being killed and eaten , despite few
biological differences that could ju stify this practice. Several scholars have noted how
the discourses on conscious experiences in AI privilege a Western European and
predominantly Christian perspective on artifacts and their relationship to nature and
society—a perspective that is not universally shared (Gunkel, 2018a; Jones, 2015;
Williams, 2019). There are also the ongoing discriminatory practices in which the appeal
to biology is treated as scientific justification for institutional oppression (Appiah, 2018).
Taken together, these considerations suggest that biological factors should not be
treated as prima facie justification for the exclusion of artificial agents from the moral
community.
Nevertheless, the literature on “robot rights” is overwhelmingly preoccupied with
whether robots have experiential or conscious states sufficiently “like ours” to warrant
social status and legal recognition (Danaher, 2019; Gunkel, 2018b; Schwitzgebel &
Garza, 2015)7. The hypercritical focus on the machine’s experience (or lack thereof)
7

These concerns predate Turing’s (1950) proposed “imitation game,” which can be read as an attempt to redirect
questions away from the machine’s “experience” and towards the actual conditions of its social performances,
including our reactions to them (Estrada, 2018; Hayles, 2008). Notice how the systematic comparison between
human and machine experiences suggested by the popular reading of Turing’s test runs afoul of Nocella’s
suggestion to avoid comparing experiences. This is not to suggest that Turing’s test is morally wrong, but to
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points to another important distinction between animals and AI: artificial agents are
already visibly engaged in a variety of human sociopolitical contexts, and there is some
reasonable expectation that their capacities will improve over relatively short time
scales. To pick a benign example, while it is extremely unlikely that the next 1000
generations of domesticated cat will develop an affinity for poetry, there are currently
bots generating poems on Twitter with hundreds of followers (Oliveira, 2017). Such
systems are already common enough that scholars have begun to discuss the
aesthetics of AI art (Hertzmann, 2019). The overlap in the sociopolitical circumstances
of human and artificial agents is not predicated on some shared biological or ecological
background, nor on shared experiences or conscious states, but more concretely on the
material and institutional realities within which human and nonhuman agents “share
existence” (Latour, 2003). Just as the shared material realities of oppression provide a
framework for collaboration among resistance movements addressing both human and
nonhuman animal interests—despite important differences in the history and
experiences motivating this work—this very same framework of resistance provides
resources to critique and resist biocentrism and anthropocentrism in the discourse
around AI and artificial agency, despite a strong tradition emphasizing the differences
between biological and artificial agents.
The possibility for radical near-term change in the agential capacities of AI
suggests its sociopolitical status will likewise remain unsettled. Asaro (2006) notes, “At
some point in the future, robots might simply demand their rights” (Asaro, 2006, p. 12).
However, such a future would require not just a change in the capacities of artificial
agents, but also an ethical and interpretive change in society’s capacities to recognize
and respect such demands as legitimate political acts. The demand for cultural changes
in our attitudes towards artificial agents echoes Turing’s plea of “fair play for machines”
(Estrada, 2018a; Turing, 1947). If the kind of critical self-reflection required to advocate
on behalf of machines was available to Turing, surely it is available to us as well.

Human supremacy in Bryson’s ethics
Joanna Bryson is a Reader and Senior Research Fellow in the Department of Computer
Science at the University of Bath. Outside her work in AI ethics, Bryson’s research
focuses on computer models of economic and cooperative behaviors, with strong
influences from cognitive and evolutionary psychology. Although this research
somewhat overlaps with her work in AI ethics (Bryson, 2015a), it is beyond the scope of
this paper to address Bryson’s full research project. Instead, the goal of this section is to
present a critical reading of the article “Robots Should Be Slaves” (RSBS) (Bryson,
2010) and other papers that shed light on its motivation, perspective, and influence on
Bryson’s efforts as a high level policy consultant in AI. Despite its theoretical problems,
Bryson’s work has the virtue of clarity and precision (sometimes unwittingly) in the
articulation of her views, and so serves as a model case for studying human
supremacist ideology in AI.
recognize that it creates social circumstances that are especially hostile to the possibility of recognizing and
respecting artificial agents (Hayes & Ford, 1995).
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Written nearly a decade before RSBS, Bryson’s earliest contribution to AI ethics
scholarship is the coauthored conference paper, “Just Another Artifact: Ethics and the
Empirical Experience of AI” (Bryson & Kime, 1998) which lays out many of the elements
of her considered view. Bryson & Kime’s explicit motivation in this paper is to address
certain “exaggerated fears” (p. 1) from Vernor Vinge and other early proponents of the
Singularity hypothesis: that computers might surpass human intelligence and take over
the world (Vinge, 1993). Bryson & Kime argue that these misplaced fears come from an
“over-identification with machines,” a mistake that is “symptomatic of a larger problem—
a general confusion about the nature of humanity and the role of ethics in society.” (p. 1)
What is the nature of humanity and the role of ethics in society? The authors claim that
“ethics has evolved as a mechanism of human social cohesion, without which society
disintegrates” (p. 2). The primary mechanism driving social cohesion is empathy: “we
care for people or objects that we would feel badly for if they were hurt or damaged”
(ibid, original emphasis). This feeling of empathy in turn creates a sense of identification
with those we empathize with. The relative strength of this identification generates an
individual’s hierarchy of ethical obligation, “with ourselves and our families tending to be
at the top, followed by our neighbours and other people with whom we acknowledge
commonality” (ibid). Bryson & Kime argue that this general picture suggests that, “selfinterest is the root of our ethics” (p. 4).
In the case of the Singularity theorists, Bryson & Kime argue that the mechanism
of social identification has been misapplied to machines. They explain this confusion by
appeal to our tendency to distinguish ourselves from animals—itself grounded in the
evolutionary drive to empathetic social cohesion. They claim, “To form a human society,
one needs to value the lives of humans in the community over the lives of other
animals” (ibid). They argue that over-identification with machines “lead[s] to an
undervaluing of the emotional and aesthetic in our society. Consequences include an
unhealthy neglect and denial of emotional experiences” (ibid). They identify two specific
dangers of over-identification, that, “we may believe the machine to be a participant in
our society, which might seriously confuse our understanding of them,” and “we may
overvalue the machine when making our own ethical judgments and balancing our own
obligations” (ibid). They dismiss any view that values AI, “to the exclusion of our own
existence” as “nihilism” (p. 6). The most substantial citation offered for these claims is
(Lakoff & Johnson, 1980).
To be clear, there are many reasons for finding these views unsatisfying as an
ethical framework. The direct line drawn between evolutionary psychology and ethical
obligation is theoretically implausible (Street, 2006). The relationship proposed between
empathy and social identification is, at best, oversimplified (Jenkins, 2014). The view
that AI is only dangerous through its misuse or abuse by humans is known in the
philosophy of technology literature as “technological neutrality” or “instrumentalism,”
(Kaplan, 2009), a problematic view as a policy position in tech development (Koops,
2006; Reed, 2007; Winner, 1980). Attributing to her opponents’ “unhealthy”
psychological disorders is a questionable rhetorical tactic that was rightly edited out of
the 2011 version. However, it is not our goal to present a scholarly critique of a
conference paper from more than twenty years ago. Instead, our goal is to trace the
development of a view that results in the explicit endorsement of slavery as a political
framework for managing robots. For our purposes, the most relevant features of
8

Bryson’s position in this paper are the claims that identification drives moral obligations,
and that identifying with AI is a mistake.
Neither claim is compelling. On purely psychological grounds, social identification
is unlikely to build models that are consistent enough to serve as a basis for moral
reasoning. Jenkins (2014) introduces the psychology of social identity by explaining,
“… our classificatory models of self and others are multidimensional, unlikely to
be internally consistent, and may not easily map onto each other. Hierarchies of
collective identification may conflict with hierarchies of individual identification,
which means that the following might make complete interactional sense: I hate
all As; you are an A; but you are my friend. Taken together, these points suggest
that categorical imperatives are unlikely to be a sufficient guide on their own , and
that the ability to discriminate between others in subtle and fine-grained ways is
an everyday necessity.” (Jenkins, 2014, p. 6)
Bryson’s later work emphasizes that moral systems should be “coherent” (Bryson,
2018b, p. 202) If identification does not produce consistent moral frameworks, it seems
highly unlikely that “over-identification” (with machines or anything else) is a serious
threat to the social order. Suggesting that AI policy should center on cultivating the
appropriate social identification practices seems impractical, to say nothing of its ethics.
For the sake of argument, however, suppose we accept Bryson’s first claim. If
identification is the root of obligation , then the psychological fact that we identify with
machines would suggest some obligations to those machines. What justifies the claim
that such identification is inappropriate or mistaken? Bryson & Kime (1998) recognize
that ethical systems can be “somewhat arbitrary,” and that in novel circumstances (as
with AI), we are “to some extent free to create a new ethical standard” (p. 5). So why not
take our identification with machines as evidence of a new set of moral obligations? The
authors defend their judgment with two responses, one they describe as “technical”, the
other “ethical” (p. 3). Their technical response recognizes that people tend to ascribe
capabilities to machines that those machines don’t have. Their ethical response
recognizes that some people might already believe that some computer programs are
more valuable than a human life, but that we face a similar challenge with other artifacts
like “fine art and political institutions” (p. 3).
Neither response addresses this issue at stake, which is how we decide which
forms of identification (and which identities) are appropriate or inappropriate. As to the
technical response: we identify not just with other people, but with sports teams and
brand names and superheroes and all manner of things. The fact that we make errors
about the capacities of these entities says very little about whether our identification with
them is appropriate or inappropriate. When fans of an underperforming sports team are
unrealistically optimistic about their performance in tonight’s game, this is not evidence
that their identification with the team is mistaken, inappropriate, or symptomatic of
deeper psychological or conceptual problems. The ethics of identification are not settled
by the accuracy of the predictions it generates.
This technical response is particularly confusing given that their proposal
contains much better resources for addressing the concern: specifically, the
evolutionary drive to “social cohesion.” On this supposedly ethics-grounding biological
9

imperative, the precise nature of the ethical system doesn’t matter so much as its
overall impact on social stability and (ultimately) the reproductive success of the
species. This would seem to make the issue an open empirical question : does
empathizing with machines make for a more stable social order? Or perhaps better as
an engineering and design question: how do we design more stable social systems
through the natural empathy people have towards machines? By insisting that the
identification with machines is a conceptual mistake, Bryson & Kime cut off these
possibilities and effectively limit the ethical discourse to controlling the frequency and
impact of these “anthropomorphic fallacies” (p. 7). In this spirit they claim, “The issue of
forming identity is now more than ever an issue for public education,” suggesting the
need for institutionalized policies that control how social identities are formed and who
we identify with.
Bryson & Kime’s second “ethical” response reveals an important assumption in
Bryson’s ethical perspective: that the evolutionary dynamics of obligation are zero sum,
and that developing new obligations towards AI would entail fewer obligations to
humans, animals, and society generally. The risk is not simply that we identify with AI,
but that we identify with AI at the expense of identifying with humans; if obligation is
zero sum, these identities are necessarily in competition. Since they assume that
obligations to other humans is vital for social cohesion , then over-identification with AI is
not merely inappropriate; it presents a clear threat to the social order. They recognize
that this threat is not unique to AI, and point to the resources used to maintain the Mona
Lisa that could be used instead for people in need. Restating this argument, Bryson &
Kime are claiming that great art threatens social cohesion (and our evolutionary
success!) by potentially generating more empathy for art than we have for other people.
Their criticism of AI is that it might pose the same threat to social cohesion as posed by
great art. One might have thought that art provides a clear example in which
identification and obligation are not zero-sum, where we might be a more stable,
cohesive, empathetic society because of the resources we invest in public art. But for
Bryson & Kime, producing great art is a social liability, a risk we accept, like car
accidents, because of the pleasure and convenience th ose artifacts bring us.
Despite their weaknesses, these positions have a strong influence on Bryson’s
later work. RSBS is published as a book chapter in 2010 after being solicited for a
conference on “Artificial Companions in Society” at Oxford in 2007. Its publication
coincides with a burst of papers and conference presentations with titles like “Building
Persons is a Choice” (Bryson, 2009); “Why robot nannies probably won’t do much
psychological damage” (Bryson, 2010b); and “AI/Robots should not be considered
moral agents” (Bryson, 2011). These papers all expand on the themes developed in
“Just Another Artifact,” highlighting the ethical challenge of over-identification with AI
and the conceptual mistakes and dangers it invites. Clearly, Bryson’s immediate goal in
this collection of work is not to subjugate robots, but to correct what she sees as the
conceptual confusion generated by an inappropriate identification with machines. In
2010, Bryson participated in a retreat that produced a set of “Principles of Robotics”
(Boden et al., 2017) that reinforces these themes. Of the five rules laid out in the
document, the first four simply state what robots are: “1: Robots are multi-use tools…, 2:
Humans, not robots, are responsible agents…, 3: Robots are products…, 4: Robots are
manufactured artifacts…” (Boden et al., 2017, p. 125ff). As a policy proposal, the
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document recommends the development of industrial identification practices that clearly
distinguish between the capacities of robots and human s. These principles give the
myopic impression that the primary ethical risk presented by AI is a metaphysical and
ontological confusion over their agential status.
The theoretical grounding for RSBS is now brought into focus. By asserting
“robots should be slaves” (Bryson, 2010a), Bryson takes for granted not only that
humans should not be treated as slaves, but also that no one would identify or
empathize with slaves. Calling robots slaves draws attention to this strong categorical
distinction between humans and robots, and challenges the excessive empathy with AI
that she takes to be the central risk at stake. In RSBS, Bryson repeats the claim of that
“our identity confusion results in somewhat arbitrary assignments of empathy” (p. 4) and
lists a set of costs for both individuals and institutions associated with the overidentification with AI (p. 5). She calls “being too generous with personhood” a “moral
hazard” (p. 7). She rehearses the zero-sum reasoning8, arguing that “humans have only
a finite amount of time and attention for forming social relationships” (p. 5). While
Bryson recognizes that the costs of identification “could be negative,” she doesn’t spend
much time discussing the social benefits of identifying with machines, or how to design
machines that maximize these benefits.
Instead, she uses her list of perceived costs to motivate what she calls the
“correct metaphor” for robotics: that “robots should be servants you own” (p. 3). She
says, “communicating the model of robot-as-slave is the best way both to get full utility
from these devices and to avoid the moral hazards” (p. 8). RSBS lists “the fundamental
claims of the paper” as:
“1. Having servants is good and useful, provided no one is dehumanized.”
2.
A robot can be a servant without being a person.
3.
It is right and natural for people to own robots.
4.
It would be wrong to let people think that robots are persons.” (p. 3)
As the list suggests, Bryson’s concern for dehumanization is mostly an afterthought.
She says, “Surely dehumanization is only wrong when it’s applied to someone who
really is human?” (p. 2) Bryson goes on to briefly discuss the history of domestic labor in
British villages from 1574-1821 in a positive light, claiming that roughly 30% of
households employed servants. She justifies this practice by appeal to the inadequacies
of an unpaid gendered division of labor, saying, “Where wives and other kin were not
available to devote their full time to these tasks, outside employees were essential” (p.
8)9. Bryson reflects favorably on the current market for domestic labor, but argues “th e
most difficult thing with human servants is of course the fact that they really are
humans, with their own goals, desires, interests, and expectations which they deserve
to be able to pursue” (p. 9).
8

In (Bryson et al 2017), Bryson et al recognize the potential problem with this zero -sum reasoning, but they appeal
to it anyway, saying “While not always a zero-sum game, sometimes extending the class of legal persons can come
at the expense of the interests of those already within it. In the past, creating new legal persons has sometimes
lead to asymmetries and corruptions such as entities that are accountable but unfunded, or fully -financed but
unaccountable.”
9 If they were essential, what did the other 70% do?
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On the other hand, because robots “are wholly owned and designed by us” (p. 9),
they cannot be frustrated, exploited, or made to suffer unless we deliberately design
them with these capacities. So long as we aren’t anthropomorphizing robots in ways
that causes confusion or excessive empathy, she says “owners should not have ethical
obligations to robots… beyond those that society defines as common sense and
decency, and would apply to any artifact” (p. 10). Bryson admits we have ethical
obligations concerning robots, about their safe operation and so on, but we have no
obligations to the robots themselves; destroying a robot is ethically equivalent to the
destruction of any property. In one of the more frustrating passages (p. 8), Bryson
suggests that people who aren’t comfortable with the metaphor of slavery might instead
adopt the perspective of extended mind theory (Clark & Chalmers, 1998), where our
tools are understood as extensions of our own capacities. Bryson doesn’t consider that
the extended mind theory encourages us to strongly identify with our machines (Ahuvia,
2005), or why this might be inconsistent with her proposal for robots-as-slaves.
Obviously, the appeal to the institution of slavery as “good and useful, … right
and natural” is profoundly insensitive and simply in poor taste. It also highlights the deep
theoretical failure in Bryson’s ethics. Just as with the Mechanix Illustrated comic from
1965, Bryson takes for granted that the public would identify with slave owners rather
than slaves, and with the 30% of the British who hired domestic servants, rather than
the 70% from whom they were hired. These assumptions speak volumes on Bryson’s
perception of her own social status and ethical obligations. More importantly, they speak
to the substantial challenges involved in grounding ethical policy in social identity
construction, challenges Bryson clearly did not anticipate when writing this essay.
Although the essay makes token gestures to recognize the cruelty of the historical
institution of racialized slavery, she takes no effort to consider how the metaphor of
slavery might be interpreted by those who don’t immediately identify—that is,
empathize—with slaveholders over slaves, or the moral hazards involved with giving
any defense of slavery as a political institution. Fundamentally, Bryson does not think
the problem with slavery was the ideology of domination and oppression it represents;
the problem with slavery was that we were enslaving the wrong things! Thankfully,
experts like Bryson are here to make sure we’re practicing slavery correctly.
RSBS has received substantial scholarly attention in the AI ethics literature
(Agar, 2019; Coeckelbergh, 2015; Frank & Nyholm, 2017; Gunkel, 2015, 2018b; Musiał,
2017; Neely, 2014; Prescott, 2017; Rainey, 2016; van Wynsberghe & Robbins, 2019).
While much of this literature is critical of Bryson’s hasty and insensitive language, few
engage Bryson’s theoretical approach from the perspective of standpoint epistemology
or critical race theory. As a consequence, the primary lesson Bryson has drawn from
this criticism is that “you cannot use the term ‘slave’ without invoking its human history”
(Bryson, 2015b). In other words, she thinks criticisms are reacting to her choice of
language, not to the oppressive ideology that language articulates, or the casual neglect
it shows for those who don’t share her identities or perspective.
So, despite these scholarly criticisms, Bryson’s work continues to develop the
central perspective in RSBS. In “Of, for, and by the people: the legal lacuna of synthetic
persons” (Bryson et al., 2017), Bryson claims that “the basic purposes of human legal
systems” include a principle that, “Should equally weighty moral rights of two types of
entity conflict, legal systems should give preference to the moral rights held by human
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beings.” (Bryson et al., 2017, p. 283) Notice the tacit assumption that part of the basic
purpose of human legal systems is to sort entities by type. Lest there remains any
ambiguity in Bryson’s intentions, she describes her position as, “an uncontroversially
light thumb on the scale in favor of human interests. Yes, this is speciesism” (ibid). In
“Patiency is not a virtue: the design of intelligent systems and systems of ethics”,
Bryson argues that making robots deserving to be moral patients “could in itself be
construed as an immoral act” (Bryson, 2018b, p. 16). In “No One Should Trust AI”
(Bryson, 2018a), Bryson argues that trust is a relationship between peers, and since we
aren’t peers with AI, “no one actually can trust AI” (emphasis original). In these papers,
one of Bryson’s explicit concerns is that malicious corporate actors might
anthropomorphize machines in order to exploit our psychological biases and legal
loopholes. While the language of slavery is absent from these essays, her solutions
nevertheless involve policy that imposes a strict hierarchy in which machines are
categorically subordinate to human interests. Since humans and machines are not
distinguished by species, describing this view as “speciesism” is inaccurate. Bryson
defense of policy that establishes an explicit social hierarchy modelled on slavery that
classifying and systematically privileges humans deserves the name human supremacy.
Dismissing these views as eccentric or theoretically untethered ignores the rise
to prominence as a speaker, consultant, and high -level policy expert that Bryson has
enjoyed in AI ethics on the strength of this work. In 2017, Bryson was quoted calling the
popular humanoid robot Sophia’s award of Saudi citizenship “bullshit” (Vincent, 2017).
The comment earned her a public debate with Sophia creator David Han son at CogX
2018 (Estrada, 2018b). In 2019, Bryson was selected to sit on the controversial
Advanced Technology External Advisory Council at Google (Johnson, 2019), a body
she continued to defend after activist protest shut the program down (Bryson, 2019). To
some extent, Bryson was in the right place when the AI boom hit to find success in the
developing field of AI ethics. At the same time, her success can be at least partly
attributed to an industry and regulatory climate that was particularly receptive to the
vision of human-centered ethics her work developed. To address the broader milieu in
which Bryson’s work finds success, we turn next to the work of Rosi Braidotti and
Charles Mills.

Reactionary posthumanism and ideal theory
If, as Bryson suggests, humanity is in the grips of an identity crisis, then Braidotti’s
framework of “the posthuman” (Braidotti, 2013) may help diagnose the problem. For
Braidotti, posthumanism marks an historical condition characterized not only by a “crisis
of Humanism,” but also the active exploration of “alternative ways of conceptualizing the
human subject” (p. 37). Braidotti identifies three strands of posthuman thought that trace
out different responses to our posthuman condition: one, a critical posthumanism
informed by anti-humanist philosophies of subjectivity from Braidotti’s own scholarly
tradition (Braidotti, 1994, 2002; Foucault, 1977); second, an analytic posthumanism that
derives from explorations of the human in science and technology studies (Roden,
2014; Verbeek, 2005, 2011); and finally, a reactionary posthumanism for whom “the
posthuman condition can be solved by restoring a humanist vision of the subject”
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(Braidotti, 2013, p. 39). Braidotti’s discussion of reactionary posthumanism is most
relevant for our treatment of Bryson’s views.
Braidotti associates reactionary posthumanism with Martha Nussbaum (1998,
2010) who, Braidotti argues, “defends the need for universal humanistic values as a
remedy for the fragmentation and relativistic drift of our times” (Braidotti, 2013, p. 39).
For Nussbaum, this fragmentation is produced by the socioeconomic condition of
globalization, which threatens humanity through the reactionary “plagues” (ibid) of
ethnocentrism and xenophobic nationalism. According to Braidotti, Nussbaum believes
that the solution to these threats is a cosmopolitan universalism informed by classical
humanist ideals. Braidotti says that for Nussbaum, “abstract universalism is the only
stance that is capable of providing solid foundations for moral values such as
compassion and respect for others” (ibid). Nussbaum acknowledges the problematic
historical use of humanist ideals as a discriminatory or exclusive practice, and she
responds to these past failures with a call for a neo-humanism that centers the
subjectivity of experience. While Braidotti praises this move, she argues that
Nussbaum, “reattaches [subjectivity] to a universalistic belief in individualism, fixed
identities, steady locations and moral ties that bind” (ibid). Because of this
“disembedded universalism, Nussbaum ends up being paradoxically parochial in her
vision of what counts as the human… leaving no room for experimenting with new
models of the self” (ibid).
For example, Braidotti describes Nussbaum’s defense of a liberal education
(Nussbaum, 2010) as “elitist and nostalgic” (Braidotti, 2013, p. 173), noting that by the
time of its publication, the university had already been refigured in the market economy
as a corporate structure (p. 150). Braidotti’s point is not simply to disagree with
Nussbaum about the value of a liberal education, but rather to recognize that the liberal
ideals which ground Nussbaum’s defense are out of touch with the material and
institutional realities which benefit from that defense. If universities are managed like
for-profit corporate chains, this muddies the narrative of the liberal ideal that the
university supposedly represents. Similarly, if the rhetoric of universalist humanism is
used to protect narrow and exclusive practices, it undermines the appeal of those
humanist ideals. The point is not that the humanist ideals—for instance, the framework
of human rights in international justice—are necessarily bad as a statement of absolute
morality, but rather that the ideals are easily used to defend the very practices that
subvert them. Similarly, when humanist ideals are used to justify an exclusive attitude
towards artificial agency its apparently inclusive framing is undermined.
Charles Mills’ (2005) critique of “ideal theory” as ideology provides conceptual
tools for thinking through this potentially confusing discursive situation. For Mills, “ideal
theory” describes not just the appeal to idealizations, which to some extent cannot be
helped in theoretical discourse. Rather, ideal theory describes “the reliance on
idealization to the exclusion, or at least marginalization, of the actual” (p. 168). For
instance, ideal theory might concern itself with how an ideal society would structure its
basic institutions, rather than addressing the social circumstances in which its actual
institutions operate. Mills claims that ideal theory will typically employ assumptions that
idealize human capacities, social institutions, and social ontology in ways that “abstract
away from relations of structural domination, exploitation, coercion, and oppression,
which in reality, of course, will profoundly shape the ontology of those same individuals”
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(p. 168). Mills says, “It is obvious that ideal theory can only serve the interests of the
privileged who, in addition—precisely because of that privilege (as bourgeois white
males)—have an experience that comes closest to that ideal, and so experience the
least cognitive dissonance between it and reality” (p. 172).
Restating the critique of Nussbaum in Mills’ terms, Braidotti is accusing
Nussbaum of embracing universalist humanism as an idealization to the exclusion of
the actual. It is beyond the scope of this paper to assess whether Braidotti’s criticisms
are fair to Nussbaum’s actual views. What matters for our purposes is Braidotti’s
analysis of how a reactionary embrace of humanist ideals in a posthuman context can
suffer from the ideology of ideal theory. The institutional realities of the corporate
influence on the university system have real implications for our discussion of the value
of higher education, and this influence can’t be dismissed or marginalized by appeal to
classical humanist ideals. Mills explains that by, “abstracting away from realities crucial
to our comprehension of the actual workings of injustice in human interactions and
social institutions” (p. 170), the appeal to ideal theory effectively guarantees that those
ideals will never be achieved.
Together, Braidotti and Mills help articulate the critical failures in Bryson’s ethics
beyond the mere insensitivity of her language. Like Nussbaum, Bryson respon ds to the
crisis of humanism by asserting nostalgic, elitist idealizations of social institutions and
social ontology, such as “servants are useful and good,” or “no one should trust AI.”
Bryson presents herself as speaking on behalf of humanity’s interest, when in fact her
proposal showcases a narrow and privileged perspective that inadvertently alienates
those who don’t already share it. In so doing, Bryson neglects the structures of power
and domination within which humans and nonhumans share existence.

Human supremacy as posthuman risk
Consider, for instance, the startup Kiwibots, which offers a food delivery service using
small robots in the Bay area. Kiwibots set itself apart from similar services in deciding
against using AI software to control their bots. Instead, as reported in the Chronicle (C.
Said, 2019), they farm out the control task out to operators in Colombia who use GPS to
direct the bot to its destination. The Colombian operators are paid less than $2 an hour,
which the Chronicle says is more than the local minimum wage. Kiwibots provides an
interesting case at the intersection of automation , teleoperation, and the global labor
market. It also provides a confounding case for idealizing proposals like Bryson’s that
insist on a strict dichotomy between humans and machines. Social policy treating this
robot as a slave would be indirectly treating another human as a slave, with many of the
same structures of exploitation and oppression the term invites. Though Bryson
explicitly rejects forms of servitude that lead to dehumanizing people, in this case we
can’t easily distinguish between the human and the robot, so we can’t tell if our
dehumanizing behavior is “appropriate” or not.
Such cases are by not unique. The New York Times reported in May that
Google’s automated assistant Duplex transfers around 25% of calls to a human
operator (Chen & Metz, 2019). After Duplex’s controversial debut, there have been
several proposals for laws that would require such automated services to identify
15

themselves as bots. These “bot disclosure” laws have faced objections from civil rights
groups like the EFF, who worry that an “across the board bot-labeling mandate would
sweep up all bots,” including those being used for protected speech (EFF, 2018). The
relative difficulty in distinguishing between human and machine behavior already means
that solving CAPTCHAs (Von Ahn, Blum, Hopper, & Langford, 2003) is part of the daily
life of a digital citizen. It’s worth recognizing that CAPTCHAs were originally developed
not only to filter out bots, but also as a source of free labor to crowdsource difficult
problems in early machine learning (Lung, 2012). This highlights the deep connections
between bot identification, the exploitation of labor, and the industry’s penchant for the
systematic classification of agents by type (Stieglitz, Brachten, Ross, & Jung, 2017;
Suárez-Serrato, Velázquez Richards, & Yazdani, 2018).
What’s the alternative to the ideal theory of reactionary posthumanism?
Following Mills, Serene Khader advocates for a nonideal universalism that emphasizes
the nonideal, unjust conditions of political action (Khader, 2018). Khader says, “One
defect of ideal theories… is their tendency to redirect our evaluative gazes to the wrong
normative phenomena” (p. 36). By redirecting that gaze towards the actual conditions of
injustice, Khader argues that we will be in a better position to address those injustices.
While Khader’s nonideal universalism is developed in the context of transnational
feminism, we might adapt the approach to an AI ethics context by recognizing the
nonideal and unjust conditions in which both human and nonhuman agents operate. A
nonideal approach to AI ethics would highlight how overlapping structures of institutional
oppression situate robots as both agents and targets of power—as agents whose
identity must be made available for inspection, public scrutiny, and abuse (Brscić,
Kidokoro, Suehiro, & Kanda, 2015; Romero, 2018; Salvini et al., 2010; Smith & Zeller,
2017). Human supremacist rhetoric reinforces these conditions, both drawing on and
reinforcing the posture of other oppressive ideologies which control the social order
through the classification and systematic privileging of agents by type. Advocating on
behalf of robots as social participants deserving of minimal respect and dignity in virtue
of that participation can encourage nothing but a more respectful, participatory, and
dignified social order.
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